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Openness to trade is one factor that has been identified as determining whether a 
country is prone to sudden stops in capital inflows, crashes in currencies, or 
severe recessions. Some believe that openness raises vulnerability to foreign 
shocks, while others believe that it makes adjustment to crises less painful. 
Several authors have offered empirical evidence that having a large tradable 
sector reduces the contraction necessary to adjust to a given cut-off in funding. 
This would help explain lower vulnerability to crises in Asia than in Latin 
America. Such studies may, however, be subject to the problem that trade is 
endogenous. Using the gravity instrument for trade openness, which is 
constructed from geographical determinants of bilateral trade, this paper finds that 
openness indeed makes countries less vulnerable, both to severe sudden stops and 
currency crashes, and that the relationship is even stronger when correcting for 
the endogeneity of trade.  
 
Keywords: Sudden Stops; Current Account Adjustment; Trade; Gravity Model. 




                                                 
* We thank Dani Rodrik, Andres Velasco, Alejandro Izquierdo, Sebnem Kalemi-Ozcan, Graciela Kaminsky, an 
anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the NBER IFM program meeting, Harvard University, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, LACEA, and the Latin American Finance Network (LFN) for valuable comments and 
suggestions.  Francisco Arizala provided excellent research assistance. All errors are ours. The authors’ respective e-
mail address are cavalloe@iadb.org and Jeffrey_Frankel@ksg.harvard.edu. 
 
   4
1. Introduction 
 
A “sudden stop”—an abrupt cut-off in capital inflows—entails a resource transfer to creditor 
countries from the debtor country. Often it also entails a financial or currency crisis in the latter, 
accompanied by a sharp fall in output.
1 Broadly speaking, there are two opposing views on the 
relationship between a country’s openness to trade and whether it is prone to these external 
crises. The first view is that trade openness makes a country more vulnerable to crises, as a 
country highly integrated into world markets is more exposed to shocks coming from abroad. 
The second view is that countries that are open to international trade are less vulnerable to 
shocks originating in foreign markets. If the ratio of trade to GDP is structurally high, it is easier 
to adjust to a cut-off in international financing of a given magnitude. This paper tests the 
relationship between trade openness and vulnerability to sudden stops to help choose between 
the two hypotheses. Such tests have been performed before, but without fully taking into account 
the possible endogeneity of trade. Our incremental contribution here is to use the gravity 
instrument for trade openness—which aggregates geographically-determined bilateral trade 
across a country’s partners—to correct for the possible endogeneity of trade. 
The view that openness makes countries more vulnerable to crises comes in a number of 
forms. One variant is that a weakening in a country’s export markets is sometimes the trigger for 
a sudden stop in capital flows, so that a high-trade country is more vulnerable. Another variant 
notes that sudden stops in finance often extend to a loss in trade credit—especially for imports, 
but sometimes also even for exports—and that the resulting shrinkage in trade is more painful if 
trade represents a larger share of the economy. A third variant says that openness to trade in 
practice goes hand in hand with openness to financial flows because, for example, much trade 
involves multinational corporations, who in turn need to be able to move money across national 
borders; or because it is harder to enforce capital controls if trade is free.
2 In the limiting case, a 
country that is in autarky with respect to trade must have a net capital account of zero due to the 
balance of payments constraint. Regardless of the specific reasoning, the notion that 
globalization leads to crises is a generalization that appeals to many. 
                                                 
1 The expression “Sudden Stops” was first used by Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdés (1995) and has since become 
increasingly popular. The first analytic approach to the problem of sudden stops is Calvo (1998).  
2 Aizenman (2003), and Aizenman and Noy (2004).   5
The view that openness to trade makes countries less vulnerable also comes with a 
number of different specific mechanisms that have been proposed. Rose (2005) argues that the 
threatened penalty of lost trade is precisely the answer to the riddle “why do countries so seldom 
default on their international debts?” and offers empirical evidence that strong trade links are 
correlated with low default probabilities.
3 International investors will be less likely to pull out of 
a country with a high trade/GDP ratio, because they know the country is less likely to default. A 
higher ratio of trade is a form of “giving hostages” that makes a cut-off of lending less likely. In 
an early contribution, Sachs (1985) suggested that Asian countries had been less vulnerable to 
debt crises than Latin American countries in the early 1980s—despite similar debt/GDP ratios—
because they had higher export/GDP ratios, which enabled them to accommodate the shocks 
better.  
Consider first a country that faces a given cut-off in financing and must adjust without 
nominal or real exchange rate flexibility. The adjustment must then come through a reduction in 
spending. To achieve a $1 billion improvement in the trade balance, the contraction has to be 
$(1/m) billion, where m is defined as the marginal propensity to import (in a Keynesian model) 
or the share of spending that falls on tradable goods (in a tradable/nontradable model). The lower 
m, the more painful the adjustment. Whether output itself falls depends, of course, primarily on 
whether wages and prices are flexible. But even in a full-employment world, sharp reductions in 
consumption are painful. 
Consider, second, a country that does have the option of nominal and real exchange rate 
flexibility. In traditional textbook models, if the adjustment is achieved in part through nominal 
and real depreciation, rather than exclusively through expenditure reduction, the country can 
accommodate the tougher new financing constraint without necessarily suffering a recession. 
This is true even if a relatively large devaluation is required to generate the necessary 
improvement in the trade balance. But since the emerging market crises of 1994-1998, 
economists have increasingly emphasized the contractionary effects of devaluation, particularly 
via the balance sheet effect: if the country’s debts are denominated in foreign currency, the 
balance sheets of the indebted banks and corporations are hit in proportion to the devaluation. If 
the economy is starting from a high ratio of trade to GDP the necessary devaluation need not be 
                                                 
3 Rose’s argument has been contested. Martinez and Sandleris (2006) argue that in the aftermath of defaults, there 
seems to be no evidence of a larger decline in bilateral trade with creditor countries affected by the default. This   6
large, and therefore the adverse balance sheet effect need not be large. But if the economy is not 
very open to trade to begin with, the necessary devaluation, and the resulting balance sheet 
impact and recession, will all be large. Again we arrive at the result that whether the necessary 
adjustment will be large and painful depends inversely on openness. The balance sheet version of 
the openness story is modeled formally by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) and Cavallo 
(2006). Both have in mind the example of Argentina, which has traditionally had a low ratio of 
trade to GDP and has suffered some of the worst sudden stops.
4  
In a recent contribution, Martin and Rey (2006) show in the setting of a general 
equilibrium model, that when emerging markets start opening their financial account but are 
closed to trade in goods, they are more prone to financial crises because profits and dividends are 
very dependent on volatile domestic demand. Therefore a policy implication of the model is that 
trade openness reduces vulnerability to financial crises.  
Despite the specific mechanisms, the hypothesis that openness to trade reduces a 
country’s vulnerability to sudden stops transcends any one formal model, causal link, or country 
example. The same is true of the hypothesis that trade openness raises a country’s vulnerability. 
These opposing views suggest that the relationship between openness to trade and probability of 
sudden stops is an empirical question. This paper seeks to choose empirically between the two 
competing hypotheses.  
What do we mean by “vulnerability to sudden stops?”  A long taxonomy of definitions of 
financial crises has developed in the literature in recent years (see Appendix A.3). Here we focus 
on two popular definitions: our first criterion will be a probit model measuring the probability of 
a sudden reduction in the magnitude of net capital inflows, following closely the definition of 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003). We also look at the definition of crisis episodes in Frankel 
and Rose (1996) and Frankel and Wei (2004), which is based on the exchange market pressure 
variable defined as percentage currency depreciation plus percentage loss in foreign exchange 
reserves. In addition to looking at the probability of a sudden stop or currency crisis, we also 
examine the subsequent output loss and its magnitude.  
                                                                                                                                                             
would imply that the declines in trade are not due to punishments imposed by these creditor countries. 
4 Even though there is empirical evidence that openness to trade ameliorates the negative effects of sudden stops that 
occur (see Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar, 2004, and Edwards, 2004a, there is a priori no reason why it should 
also affect the ex ante probability of a crisis. One possibility is that in a country where sudden stops are associated 
with large recessions, they are more likely to occur, because the country will default to avoid a recession, as stated in    7
We are not the first to test the relationship between trade openness and vulnerability to 
some form of financial crises. Edwards (2004a) is among the empirical papers that find that 
openness to trade is associated with fewer sudden stops. On the other hand, Milesi-Ferretti and 
Razin (1998, 2000) find conflicting evidence in their analysis of current account reversals and 
currency crises.
5   
These papers measure trade openness using the trade/GDP ratio. But a critic might argue 
that the trade/GDP ratio is endogenous. One way in which trade openness could be endogenous 
is via income: richer countries tend to liberalize trade barriers—in part because their mode of 
public finance shifts from tariff revenue to income or value added taxes.  A second way is that 
trade liberalization could be part of a more general reform strategy driven by a pro-globalization 
philosophy or “Washington Consensus” forces. Other aspects of such a reform program, such as 
privatization, financial liberalization, or macroeconomic stabilization might affect the probability 
of crises, and yet an OLS regression analysis might inappropriately attribute the effect to trade. A 
third way that trade openness could be endogenous is that experience with crises—the   
dependent variable—may itself cause liberalization, via an IMF program. Or it might have the 
opposite effect, if a country’s response to a crash is disenchantment with globalization and the 
Washington Consensus. A fourth way in which trade openness could be endogenous is through 
the feedbacks between trade and financial openness. Aizenman (2003) shows in the setting of a 
simple model how more commercial openness increases the effective cost of enforcing financial 
repression, rendering financial openness a by-product of greater trade integration. Similarly, one 
could potentially think of a reverse causality process whereby, for example, greater financial 
openness may reduce the cost of trade credit and encourage FDI, and both adjustments may 
facilitate more commercial trade.
6  
How can the endogeneity of trade be addressed? We use gravity estimates to construct an 
instrumental variable for trade openness. This methodology was developed by Frankel and 
Romer (1999) in the context of the effect of trade on growth and was later applied to a variety of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cavallo (2006). The opposite relationship, however, is also possible. Dooley (2000) has suggested that when crises 
lead to recessions, countries are more likely to take care to avoid them, and so sudden stops are less likely. 
5 Along with current account balance, terms of trade, world interest rates and other variables. Easterly, Islam and 
Stiglitz (2001) find that trade openness raises output volatility.    
6 Aizenman and Noy (2004) empirically investigate the presence of two-way feedbacks between financial and trade 
integration.   8
settings in which trade and some other variable could potentially be jointly determined.
7 
Basically, it consists of aggregating up across a country’s partners the prediction of a gravity 
equation that explains trade with distance, population, language, land-border, land-area, and 
landlocked status. Gravity estimates are a good instrumental variable because they are based on 
geographical variables which are plausibly exogenous and yet, when aggregated across all 
bilateral trading partners, are highly correlated with a country’s overall trade. 
We use capital account (also known as financial account) and current account data for all 
countries in the world with data available from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) to 
identify statistically sudden stops in capital flows.  The data set covers 141 countries in total for 
the period 1970-2002. Using instrumental variables techniques and controls for other plausible 
determinants of external crises, we show that (lack of) trade openness is indeed a powerful 
predictor of these events: moving from Argentina’s current trade share (approximately 20 
percent of GDP) to Australia’s average trade share (approximately 30 percent of GDP), reduces 
the probability of a sudden stop at least 1 percentage point.  Given that sudden stops are low-
probability events, this is equivalent to approximately 40 percent of the unconditional probability 
of a crisis. Some may find this result counterintuitive: trade protectionism does not “shield” 
countries from the volatility of world markets, as proponents might hope. On the contrary, less 
trade openness leads to greater vulnerability to sudden stops and currency crises.   
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we elaborate on the empirical 
strategy and discuss the estimation method. Next, we present standard probit results using 
sudden stop episodes as the dependent variable and confirm the negative correlation between 
trade openness and the probability of sudden stops that has already been noted in the literature. 
We then present instrumental variable probit results to show that the direction of causality goes 
from trade openness to reduced vulnerability to sudden stops. Next, we repeat the exercise using 
the Frankel and Rose (1996) definition of crisis episodes and confirm the previous results. We 
perform several robustness checks, including using alternative dependent variables.  Among 
these are several measures of composite output loss in the aftermath of sudden stops. We find 
evidence that openness to trade effectively reduces the output cost of crises that occur. Finally, 
we discuss results and conclude. 
                                                 
7 For example, Frankel and Rose (2002) shows that currency unions may raise output, via trade.  For a survey of the 
gravity model in general, and applications and extensions, see Chapters 4 and 6 of Frankel (1997).   9
 
2. Empirical Strategy 
 
We begin by testing whether countries that trade more are (all else equal) more or less prone to 
sudden stops in capital flows.  We estimate variants of the following equation: 
SSi,t = c + φ(Trade Openness)i,t-1 + ωZ + µi,t                                        (1) 
where  
•  SSi,t takes a value of 1 if a sudden stop hits country i at year t and 0 otherwise, 
and 
•  Z is a set of lagged regressors included for robustness check purposes. 
 
Let us begin with the dependent variable. In order to construct SSi,t, we follow the Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Mejía (2003) criteria for a sudden cut in foreign capital inflows (i.e., worsening of 
the financial account surplus, FA) that is not the consequence of a positive shock (namely a trade 
shock). Using a dataset containing annual observations for all the countries in the world with 
available data in the IMF International Financial Statistics database (IFS) for the period 1970-
2002, we compute sudden stop episodes as a reduction in the CA deficit during the same year as 
a reduction in FA surplus. To guarantee that this reduction in the CA deficit is not the result of a 
boom—rising export,s imports and income—the episode has to be disruptive, i.e., accompanied 
by a simultaneous reduction in real output or international reserves. In other words, a sudden 
stop occurs during the year in which there is a noticeable reduction in the current account deficit 
that is accompanied by a recessionary reduction in foreign capital inflows.
8 Based on alternative 
definitions of what is “noticeable” and “disruptive,” we compute five classifications of sudden 
stops to be used as robustness checks for the results.    
The preferred definition is SS1. This algorithm classifies as a sudden stop a situation in 
which at a year t, the financial account surplus of country i (prevailing at year t-1) falls at least 
two standard deviations below the sample mean for that country; the current account deficit falls 
by any amount either in t or in t+1; and GDP per capita falls by any amount either in t or in t+1.”  
The overall global pattern of sudden stops under this criterion is summarized in Figure 1. 
                                                 
8 Technical details are left to the Data Appendix.    10


































































































































































Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The total number of episodes captured using this methodology is 86, which is 2.4 percent 
of total available country/year observations in the dataset.
9 As Figure 1 shows, these events take 
place around well-known crises periods: the early 198’s debt crises in Latin America; the 1992-
1993 European Monetary System crises; the 1997-1998 Asian crises; and the new wave of crises 
in developing countries in the late 1990s and 2001. In terms of regional distribution, 16 percent 
of all sudden stops occurred in the Asia-Pacific region; 13 percent in Europe; 33 percent in Latin 
America; 15 percent in the Middle East; 21 percent in Africa; and 1 percent each in South Asia 
and North America. Alternative definitions show similar patterns of temporal/spatial distribution 
(graphs available in Appendix A.5). 
On the regressors’ side of the equation, trade openness is typically measured as a 
country’s ratio of total trade to GDP—(X + M / Y). All these data are readily available from the 
IFS and the World Development Indicators CD-ROM (WDI) for almost all countries. But, as 
                                                 
9 The complete list of crisis episodes per country, plus data availability, is in Table A.1. in Appendix A.1.   11
argued in the introduction, the problem of using this measure of trade openness is that it might be 
correlated with other unobserved country characteristics, creating identification problems and 
potentially biased estimators. The contribution we seek to make to the literature is to avoid these 
problems by using instrumental variables regression techniques. We instrument trade openness 
by the predicted ratio of trade to GDP based on gravity equations. In its most basic form, the 
gravity equation captures the intuitive notion that bilateral trade flows are proportional to the 
product of each country GDP level, and inversely related to the distance between them. 
Therefore, the “predicted” trade to GDP ratio can be computed from data on countries’ 
geographic characteristics, bilateral trade flows, and GDP.  The gravity model has become 
popular, and there are some very extensive databases that can be used for these computations. 
We used the dataset at Andrew Rose’s webpage,
10 which is perhaps the most complete one 
available and has been widely used for empirical research.  Details on the methodology are left 
to the Appendix. The important point is that, to the extent that the “predicted” trade to GDP ratio 
is highly correlated with the actual trade to GDP ratio,
11 it is a good instrument, because it is less 
likely that geography is related to economic outcomes through any channel other than trade. In 
other words, geography is quite plausibly exogenous.
12  
As for the control variables, Z is a set of lagged regressors included for robustness check 
purposes and to minimize potential omitted variable bias. These are the following:  
  Liability Dollarization. This variable introduces  “balance sheet” effects into the 
empirical model. According to the emerging markets crises literature,
13 the mismatch 
between the currency denomination of assets and liabilities in the private and public 
balance sheets of these countries increases the output costs of external shocks that trigger 
real exchange rate depreciations, such as sudden stops in capital flows. Indeed, some sort 
of “balance sheet” mismatch is required to explain why real depreciations are 
                                                 
10 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm. The data set consists of 41,678 bilateral trade observations 
spanning six different years (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995). All 186 countries, dependencies, territories, 
overseas departments, colonies, and so forth for which the United Nations Statistical Office collects international 
trade data are included in the data set. The trade data are taken from the World Trade Database, a consistent 
recompilation of the U.N. trade data presented in Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997), augmented with data from 
the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook. This data set is estimated to cover at least 98 percent of all trade. 
11 The actual correlation between the variable “trade openness” and the instrument used in this paper is 0.52. 
12 To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper that addressed the problem of endogeneity explicitly is Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Mejía (2003). They use instruments in a probit context along the lines suggested by Rivers and Vuong 
(1998).  
13 See, for example, Krugman (1999).   12
contractionary in some countries, because in a world without these imperfections or 
some other explanation, real depreciations should be expansionary.
14 The impact of this 
variable on the probability of a crisis is a priori ambiguous:
15 there is no reason why 
something (i.e., liability dollarization) that makes the consequences of a crisis worst (i.e, 
more recessionary) should also necessarily make them more likely. Indeed, the effect 
could go the other way.
16 Since we cannot assume ex ante that there is no effect, we 
include it in some of the specifications. We use two alternative measures of “liability 
dollarization”: (i) One is the ratio of foreign liabilities of the financial sector to money 
(IFS line 26C/Line 34).  This is not a direct measure of the extent to which a country’s 
balance sheets present a mismatch in the currency denomination of assets and liabilities. 
Nevertheless this variable has been used in the literature as a proxy,
17 primarily because 
it is available for almost all countries since 1970 and because it should be correlated to 
actual balance sheet mismatches. (ii) Our alternative proxy is a measure of deposit 
dollarization from Arteta (2005a and 2005b). This is “Dollar Deposits / Total Deposits” 
in the financial system. Intuitively, countries with a high percentage of deposit 
dollarization, but whose domestic currency is not the U.S. dollar, are (most likely) 
countries whose public and private sectors tend to borrow heavily in a currency different 
from their own. In Arteta’s database, data on the aggregate volume of foreign-currency-
denominated (“dollar”) deposits of residents are available for 92 developing and 
transition economies. The time span varies across countries, with some having data from 
as early as 1975 and some having data only from about 1995 onwards.  
  Foreign Debt /GDP is included to control for the level of de-facto financial openness. 
Without debt to service, there are no sudden stops to worry about. Data for “Foreign 
Debt/GDP” comes from IFS.
18 
                                                 
14 See Céspedes et al. (2003) for a thorough discussion. 
15 Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) argue that “domestic liability dollarization” increases the probability of sudden 
stops. 
16 Cavallo (2006) builds a model where things that make the consequences of a crisis worst increase the probability 
that a bad shock (i.e., tight global liquidity) leads to a full-fledged crisis. On the other hand, in the spirit of Dooley 
(2000), one could expect countries that have higher dollarization ratios to do more to protect themselves against the 
crises because they are aware of the extent of the potential losses.  
17 E.g., Alesina and Wagner (2003) and Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2003). 
18 Foreign debt is line 89a in the IFS dataset.   13
  CA/GDP is “Current Account Balance/GDP.”  It controls for the “quantity” of the 
resource transfer required in the aftermath of a sudden stop in inflows. It is expected that, 
with other things equal, countries with larger current account deficits ex ante will have a 
higher probability of experiencing a crisis.  
  The log of Reserves in months of imports is included because foreign exchange reserves 
could be used as self-insurance against sudden stops, making crises less likely. 
  The log of GDP per capita  is included to control for the stage of economic development.  
  FDI /GDP is included because it is conceivable that stability of FDI flows could reduce 
the likelihood of sudden stops. But the reverse effect is also possible: Guimaraes and 
Morris (2003) develop a model where foreign direct investment (illiquid investments in 
the target currency) make crises more likely.  
  Institutional quality is included to determine whether “trade openness,” instrumented or 
uninstrumented, is incorrectly appropriating effects on sudden stops that really go 
through institutions. 
  The ratio of short term debt to total debt controls for the effect of the term structure of 
the debt in the likelihood of a crisis.  
  Index of exchange rate rigidity, the final variable, is a measure of nominal exchange rate 
rigidity that is included to test whether monetary policy affects the probability of sudden 
stops.  
 
Most of these variables come from WDI CD-ROM, with the exception of the 
“institutional quality” data, which come from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido Lobatón (2002) and 
the Marshall and Jaggers (2002) Polity IV Project, and data on “index of exchange rate rigidity,” 
which come from Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) and are based on their “de facto” 
exchange rate classification. 
We first present results without instrumental variables in order to confirm the existence 
of a negative correlation between sudden stops and trade openness. Our specification is Probit.  
Then, we present the results based on instrumental variables for Probit (IV probit). We report 
fixed-effects results only for ordinary probit regressions because the instrument used in the IV 
regressions has, by construction, almost no time series variation. While this is not a serious 
limitation, because most of the variation in trade openness is across countries, not over time, the   14
problem is that without country fixed effects we cannot be sure that the estimated coefficient is 
not biased due to some omitted variable.
19 To minimize this problem, we include controls in all 
the regressions for various possible determinants of sudden stops. Reassuringly, the results we 
obtain are consistent across all the alternative specifications, suggesting that omitted variable 
bias is not driving our results. But even at the risk of some persistent omitted variable bias, the 
methodology used here is at least properly controlling for endogeneity so that reverse causality 
cannot be blamed for the estimated effect of trade openness on the probability of sudden stops. 
Summary statistics for all the variables are found in Appendix A.4. 
We then run similar regressions where the dependent variable is currency crises, from the 
Frankel-Rose (1996) and Frankel-Wei (2004) definition, instead of the sudden stop measure.
20 
They define crisis episodes based on the foreign market pressure index. This index is defined as 
the percentage fall in reserves plus the percentage fall in the foreign exchange value of the 
currency. The idea is that this index measures the fall in demand for the country’s currency 
(which is conceivably another form of sudden stops); it is then up to the monetary authorities to 
determine whether to accommodate, by letting the money supply fall, or to depreciate. To avoid 
treating every year of a multi-year high-inflation period as a separate crisis, the approach 
followed by the authors requires that the increase in exchange market pressure represent an 
acceleration of at least an additional 10 percent over the preceding period to be considered a 
crisis episode; and they also adopt an exclusion window of three years. The total number of 
episodes captured using this methodology is 419, which is 13 percent of total available 
country/year observations in the dataset. This means that the alternative way of computing crisis 
episodes is much more comprehensive than the sudden stop criterion. The overall global pattern 
of crises events under this criterion is summarized in Figure 2.
21  
 
                                                 
19 We are aware of the incidental parameter problem with fixed effect probit. However, it is an asymptotic problem, 
and in our sample the number of countries is finite. 
20 Summary statistics are in Appendix A.4 
21 For further details on the methodology and additional summary statistics, please refer to Frankel and Wei (2004).   15
Figure 2: Crises Episodes Based on Frankel and Wei (2004) 
“Foreign Exchange Market Pressure Index”  
 





We begin by estimating non-instrumental variables variants of equation (1). We compute 
standard errors robust to clustered heteroskedasticity.
22 All independent variables are lagged one 
period to ameliorate endogeneity.
23 Estimation includes year fixed effects and regional dummies, 
but these coefficients are not reported. The results reported here are based on SS1, but, as shown 
in the robustness checks, all estimates are robust to the use of alternative definitions of sudden 
stops. We do not exclude contiguous crisis episodes, but all the results reported here are robust to 
the inclusion of a one-year, two-sided omission window around crisis episodes (see Appendix 
A.5).  
                                                 
22 Clusters by country. 
23 Trade openness is lagged one year, in spite of the fact that it is ultimately instrumented, to avoid spurious 
correlation that could be due to the cases in which a sudden stop occurred at the beginning of the year and a decline 
Crisis Episodes  












Crises Episodes  16
The explanatory power of the regressions is not high. This is not surprising; it is 
consistent with the performance of standard models of crises and the usual inability of leading-
indicator exercises to properly predict events.
24 Table 1 summarizes the results for some variants 
of (1) using ordinary probit specification.  
 
Table 1. Ordinary Probit Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1    
(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
-0.322 -0.516 -0.517 -0.58  -0.597 -0.812  -0.903  -0.858  -0.801
Trade openness t-1 
(0.22) (0.25)**  (0.25)**  (0.26)**  (0.26)** (0.35)**  (0.34)***  (0.34)**  (0.37)**
-3.587 -3.577 -3.65  -3.571  -4.898  -5.245  -5.756 
Current Account/ GDP t-1   
(1.16)***  (1.19) *** (1.22) *** (1.25) ***  (1.61) ***  (1.77) ***  (1.96) ***  
0.008 0.017  0.003  0.028  0.088 0.084 
Foreign Debt/GDP t-1    
(0.2) (0.21) (0.30)  (0.25) (0.25)  (0.27)   
0.346 0.32  0.321  0.314  0.311 
Liability Dollarization  t-1     
(0.18)* (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.23)   
0.627 1.033  0.672  0.534  Short Term Debt/ Total 
Debt  t-1      
(0.65) (0.74)  (0.76)  (0.75)  
0.163 0.077  0.069  Effectiveness of 
Government       
(0.20) (0.24)  (0.25)  
0.151 0.167 
Ln GDP per capita t-1         
(0.18) (0.18)   
-0.02 
FDI/GDP t-1          
(0.03)   
Regional  Dummies?  YES YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  NO 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES  YES  YES YES  YES  YES  YES YES  YES 
Country Fixed-Effects?  NO  NO NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
-2.486 -2.582 -2.583  -2.736  -2.765 -2.227  -3.189  -3.329  -0.31 
Constant 
(0.32) ***  (0.36) ***  (0.36) *** (0.37) *** (0.55) ***  (0.42) ***  (1.26) ***  (1.29) *** (0.61) 
Observations  1124 1124 1124  1124  905  773  773  773  1124 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
These results confirm the existence of a negative correlation between trade openness and 
the likelihood of a sudden stop, as previously documented in Edwards (2004a). Column (1) 
includes only lagged trade openness alongside with regional and time dummies, while columns 
(2) to (8) sequentially include some of the control variables discussed in the previous section, to 
                                                                                                                                                             
in trade resulted from it. Introducing contemporaneous rather than lagged variables does not affect the results. See 
Tables A.5.1 and A.5.2 in Appendix A.5. 
24 See, for example, Arteta (2005b).   17
check that these results are not biased by omitted variables.
25 The effect of trade openness on the 
probability of sudden stops increases in absolute value and in statistical significance as additional 
control variables are included in the regressions, suggesting that, if anything, possible omitted 
variable bias is working in the direction of diminishing the effect that we identify.     
As a first control, in column (2) we include the lagged current account balance as a share 
of GDP, to account for the size of the transfer that is required in the aftermath of the sudden stop. 
The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant. The implication is as 
conjectured: sudden stops are more likely when a larger resource transfer is expected in its 
aftermath (i.e., when the initial CA deficit is high).  
The coefficient on the lagged Foreign Debt / GDP, although positive, does not appear 
statistically significant in column (3).
26  This is consistent with the hypothesis that different 
countries are able to tolerate different levels of debt.
27  
Similarly, the coefficient that seeks to capture the “balance sheet” effects – the lagged 
liability dollarization – is positive but only marginally statistically significant in column (4). We 
obtain similar results when we use Arteta’s measure of liability dollarization. These measures of 
dollarization appear not to have significant detrimental effects in terms of increased vulnerability 
to sudden stops. 
As for the other controls included in columns (4) to (8): the coefficient on “short term 
debt to total debt” appears as small and positive, but not statistically significant.
28  T h e  
institutional quality proxy is not statistically significant,
29 and neither are the level of GDP per 
capital nor the level of FDI flows. Importantly, the inclusion of these variables does not change 
significantly the estimate of the effect of trade openness on the probability of a sudden stops, 
                                                 
25 We included controls for all the possible determinants of sudden stops as discussed in the previous section, but as 
the results remain unchanged, for brevity we only report a subset of all the regressions. Additional results are 
reported in Appendix A.5. 
26 Similarly, Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003) do not find a significant effect of total public debt in their probit 
regressions for sudden stops, nor do Frankel and Rose (1996) in their probit regressions of currency crashes.  
27 Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003). Using “Foreign Debt/Exports” as a solution to concerns about how 
foreign debt and GDP are measured in domestic currency fails to change any results. 
28  The insignificance of this variable might also be explained by high collinearity between the “short-term debt to 
total debt” ratio and “liability dollarization.” When the latter is excluded, the former is typically significant, with the 
correct sign.  The correlation between these two explanatory variables is almost 0.40. 
29 As a measure of institutional quality we report the coefficient on “effectiveness of government” which is one of 
the six proxies of institutional quality in Kaufman et al. (2002). This institutional quality data is not in panel form, so 
every country in the sample is assigned a single (time-invariant) value. As additional robustness checks, we also use 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002)’s Polity IV Project data, which is panel (country/year). Using this alternative measure 
does not change the results, so we do not report them.   18
suggesting that the identified stabilizing effect of trade openness is not simply spurious. In order 
to probe this hypothesis further, in column (9) we replace all the control variables and the 
regional dummies with country fixed effects. The results are reassuringly similar to those in 
column (8), both qualitatively and quantitatively: trade openness significantly reduces the 
probability of sudden stops.  
All the results reported in Table 1 are robust to the inclusion of additional variables in the 
regressions (see Table A.5.1 in Appendix A.5). Regional dummies (not reported) are 
insignificant. Nevertheless, as already noted, the methodology employed thus far cannot 
guarantee the exogeneity of trade openness and therefore, it falls short of establishing causality.  
Now we come to what we hope is our contribution to the state of the art. Table 2 presents 





Table 2. Instrumental Variables Probit Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1    
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) 
-1.632 -1.841  -1.824  -1.998  -2.164 -2.893  -2.968  -3.067 
Trade openness t-1 
(0.52)*** (0.68) *** (0.63) ***  (0.59) *** (0.60) ***  (0.52) ***  (0.53) *** (0.55) ***
-6.496 -6.014  -6.275  -5.991 -5.881  -7.015  -6.532 
Current Account/ GDP t-1   
(1.33) *** (1.39) ***  (1.41) *** (1.31) ***  (1.40) ***  (1.61) *** (1.65) ***
0.24 0.272  0.369 0.697  0.801  0.688 
Foreign Debt/ GDP t-1    
(0.25) (0.24) (0.28)  (0.30)** (0.30)  *** (0.31)** 
0.512 0.353  0.114 0.089  0.133 
Liability Dollarization  t-1      
(0.20)** (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
1.526 1.645  0.713  0.742  Short Term Debt/ Total 
Debt  t-1        
(0.78)* (0.89)* (1.05) (1.03) 
0.371 0.142  0.123  Effectiveness of 
Government          
(0.19)** (0.22)  (0.21) 
0.372 0.347 
Ln GDP per capita 
t-1            
(0.20)* (0.20)* 
0.06 
FDI/GDP t-1              
(0.04) 
Regional  Dummies?  YES  YES  YES YES YES  YES YES  YES 
                                                 
30 The method of estimation is maximum likelihood, and standard errors are corrected to account for clustered 
heteroskedasticity.  The results are robust when a two-sep estimator is implemented using the method of Newey 
(1987).     19
Year  Fixed-Effects?  YES  YES  YES YES YES  YES YES  YES 
-1.709 -1.847  -1.882  -2.028  -1.807 -0.823  -3.276  -3.056 
Constant 
(0.32) *** (0.36) *** (0.36) ***  (0.37) *** (0.55) ***  (0.42) (1.26)**  (1.29)** 
Observations  1039 1039  1039  1039  827  732  732  732 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2.b. Marginal Effects (for trade openness) after ivprobit 
  Marginal effects (dy/dx) are for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) 
Trade openness t  -1  -0.098 -0.08  -0.08  -0.09 -0.12  -0.21  -0.21 -0.22 
Probability of a 
positive outcome    2.6% 1.76% 1.8%  1.8% 2.4%  3.4%  3.1% 3.2% 
                  Estimated effects of a 10 percentage point change in trade openness 
Δ(PSS) in percentage 
points 
-0.98 -0.8  -0.8  -0.9 -1.2  -2.1  -2.1 -2.2 
% Δ(PSS)  -37% -45% -44% -48% 50%  -63%  -66% -68% 
Δ(PSS) and % Δ(PSS) calculated for a 10 percentage point increase in trade openness(i.e., an increase of  0.10 in the 
independent variable). 
Δ(PSS) is the estimated change in the probability of a positive outcome (line 2), in percentage points,  given by a 10 
percentage point increase in trade openness. The calculations are based on the marginal effects reported in line 1. 
% Δ(PSS) is the estimated change in the probability of a sudden stop, calculated as a percentage of the unconditional 
probability of a crisis (line 2),  given by 10 percentage point  increase in trade openness It is computed by multiplying 
the marginal effect (line 1) by 0.10 and diving by the probability of a positive outcome (line 2).  
Marginal effects estimated at the mean of the independent variables. 
 
The results are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 1, although the point estimates 
of the coefficient on trade openness are quantitatively different. Interestingly, when we use 
gravity estimates as instrumental variables for trade openness, the point estimates are noticeably 
greater in absolute value. This means that correcting for the potential sources of endogeneity, the 
effect of trade openness on the probability of sudden stop is even stronger than what one would 
be led to conclude from the OLS regressions.
31  
                                                 
31 One possible reason why the IV coefficients are bigger in absolute value than the ordinary probit is because our 
instrumental variable might be correcting for measurement error that creates attenuation bias. If the actual recorded 
trade share measures the true “openness” variable (the relevant measure of openness for the question how severely 
the economy must contract to generate quickly a given quantity of foreign exchange) with error, and if the 
measurement error is more important than reverse causality and omitted variable bias, then we can expect to get 
bigger IV coefficients. A similar point is made in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). We thank Sebnem 
Kalemi-Ozcan for suggesting this possibility to us.    20
Table 2.b reports the implied marginal effects for trade openness estimated from the IV 
probit regressions at the mean of the independent variables (first row).
32 It also reports the 
predicted change in the probability of a sudden stop for a 10 percentage point increase in 
openness (which illustrates the effect of going from Argentina’s situation to Australia’s):  it 
combines the marginal effects with the estimated probability of sudden stops (second row).
33 The 
results indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in trade openness reduces the probability of a 
crisis by between 1 and 2 percentage points (third row). Given that sudden stops are, by 
construction, low-probability events, these seemingly small changes constitute a large share of 
the probability of a crisis.
34 They  range between 37 percent and 68 percent. That is, a country 
that trades 10 percent less of GDP (i.e., Argentina vis-à-vis Australia) is, ceteris paribus, at least 
37 percent more likely to be hit by a sudden stop.  
The rest of the point estimates are qualitatively similar to those found in Table 1. In spite 
of these results, it is worth reemphasizing that the methodology here only promises the 
exogeneity of trade openness, so no causal relationship can be derived from the other estimates. 
Next, we redo the exercise using the Frankel-Rose and Frankel-Wei definition of crises as 
the dependent variable. In Table 3 we report ordinary probit results, and in Table 4 we present IV 
probit results with gravity estimates as the instrumental variable for trade. The sample size is 
smaller as, for comparability purposes, it is limited to countries for which we have data for 
sudden stops as well. Given that crises episodes are related to currency crashes, in the reported 
regressions we include as control variables the set of variables that are typically identified as 
determinants of currency crises in the literature (see Frankel and Rose, 1996).
35 
Table 3. Ordinary Probit Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Episodes   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-0.318  -0.43  -0.467 -0.542 -0.582 
Trade openness t-1 
(0.22)  (0.21)**  (0.21) **  (0.21) **  (0.21)*** 
Ln Reserves in Months of    -0.284 -0.277  -0.27  -0.236 
                                                 
32 Note that the magnitudes of the effects at the tail of the distribution will be lower than at the mean because a 
normal CDF is fitted to the data. Thus, the results reported below should be taken as an approximation. 
33 A 10 percentage point increase in the independent variable “trade openness” is, for example, an increase from the 
mean value of this variable in the sample, which is 0.73, to 0.83 (see Appendix A.4. for summary statistics). It is 
also an increase equal to approximately 0.25 standard deviations. 
34 Recall that the unconditional probability of a crisis in the whole sample is just 2.4 percent. 
35 Regressions with additional control variables and sample size that is not limited by the availability of data of 
sudden stops are reported in Tables A.5.3 and A.5.4 in Appendix A.5.   21
Imports    (0.06) ***  (0.06) ***  (0.06) ***  (0.07) *** 
0.141 0.148 0.102  Exchange Rate Rigidity 
Index t-1    
(0.08)* (0.08)*  (0.09) 
0.265 0.247 
Foreign Debt / GDP t-1     
(0.19) (0.19) 
-0.219 
Effectiveness of Government      
(0.11) ** 
Regional  Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES 
Year  Fixed-Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES 
-1.538 -1.15 -1.356 -1.48  -1.29 
Constant 
(0.32) ***  (0.25) ***  (0.26) ***  (0.30) ***  (0.30) *** 
Observations  611 611 611 611 573 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   22
Table 4. Instrumental Variables Probit Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: Crisis Episodes    
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
-0.877 -1.396 -1.477  -1.37  -1.314  Trade openness t-1 
(0.52)*  (0.52)***  (0.54) ***  (0.51) ***  (0.51) *** 
-0.34  -0.333 -0.316 -0.279  Ln Reserves in Months of 
Imports     (0.07) ***  (0.07) ***  (0.07) ***  (0.07) *** 
0.152 0.155 0.111  Exchange Rate Rigidity 
Index t-1        (0.08)* (0.08)*  (0.09) 
0.433 0.411 
Foreign Debt / GDP t-1 
         (0.25) (0.25) 
-0.143  Effectiveness of Government              (0.10) 
Regional Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES 
-1.071 -0.234 -0.396 -0.839 -0.788 
Constant 
(0.65) (0.73) (0.78) (0.67) (0.63) 
Observations  583 583 583 583 548 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The main highlights are the following: 
  Openness reduces the probability of a currency crisis. The point estimates are not as 
large in absolute value as those obtained when using SS1, but the new coefficients are 
always statistically significant at standard confidence levels, and the instrumental 
variables results are still stronger than the ordinary probit results. This reinforces the 
point already made, that correcting for the potential sources of endogeneity, the effect of 
trade openness on the probability of an external crisis is even stronger than what one 
would be led to conclude from the OLS regressions that use the trade to GDP ratio as a 
measure of openness.  
  The coefficient on Foreign Debt / GDP is positive and (weakly) statistically significant 
in the IV probit regressions, suggesting that the presence of a large stock of foreign debt 
as a percentage of GDP increases the probability of crisis. The result is not robust in the 
ordinary probit regressions and is idiosyncratic to this particular definition of crisis 
episodes.   23
  The coefficient on log of reserves in months of imports is systematically negative and 
statistically significant across both, standard and IV probit regressions. This suggests that 
having a large stockpile of reserves reduces the probability of being hit by a crisis. This 
result is interesting because this variable is always insignificant in the regressions that 
use SS1 as the dependent variable.
36 The most likely reason for the difference is the way 
in which crises are defined in both cases. The Frankel-Rose definition of crisis episodes 
uses the foreign exchange market pressure index, which itself includes change in 
reserves in the definition, while SS1 does not.
37 
  The coefficient on index of exchange rate rigidity is positive and statistically significant 
across many of the regressions in both tables. This suggests that having a peg increases 
the chances of being hit by a crisis. This result is also idiosyncratic to this definition of 
crises. 
   The variable “effectiveness of government” enters the regressions with the expected 
negative sign and is statistically significant (in the ordinary probit regressions) at 
standard confidence levels. This suggests that having better institutions reduces the 
likelihood of crises. 
 
The rest of the controls never appear as statistically significant, but all the results are 
robust to the inclusion of these variables from the regressions. Regional dummies (not reported) 
are always insignificant.  
We find it reassuring that we obtain very similar results using two very different 
definitions of crises. We also obtain some additional results in terms of other variables that 
increase or reduce the probability of a crisis, but we choose not to emphasize these so strongly 
because the methodology we propose here only promises the exogeneity of openness.  
 
 
                                                 
36 Variable not reported in regressions in Tables 1 and 2, but reported in Tables A.5.1 and A.5.2 in appendix A.5. 
37 Although we don’t report it here, the coefficient on “CA / GDP” is systematically insignificant across all 
regressions that use Frankel-Rose’s crises episodes as the dependant variable. This is also different from the case in 
which the dependent variable is “SS1.” Once again the most likely reason is the definition of the crisis variable 
itself. Recall that “SS1” is built upon the assumption that there is an outstanding current account deficit that has to 
be abruptly reduced in the presence of a crisis; while in the alternative definition of crises, an episode can occur 
independently of what happens to the current account if the government is willing to give up reserves to finance an 
outstanding deficit.   24
4. Robustness Checks 
 
Finally, we perform a variety of robustness checks. First, we look at alternative definitions of 
sudden stops. Based on variants of what is “noticeable” and “disruptive” we compute five 
classifications of sudden stops to be used as robustness checks: our preferred definition “SS1,” 
and four alternative: “SS2,” “SS3,” “SS4,” and “SS5.”  These definitions are fully described in 
Appendix A1. “SS2” and “SS3” are conceptually equivalent to “SS1,” but are more restrictive in 
that they capture fewer episodes because they have more stringent definitions of financial flows 
volatility. “SS4” is, instead, equivalent to “SS1” but is less restrictive in that classifies as sudden 
stops events that do not necessarily trigger output contractions. “SS5” is equivalent to “SS1” but 
uses the criterion that the sudden stop be accompanied by a loss of reserves rather than a fall in 
output. Finally, we also use Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2006) definition of sudden stops, 
which we call “systemic” because, in order to isolate episodes of capital account reversals related 
to systemic events of an external origin, these authors defined crises as periods of net capital 
inflows collapse that are accompanied by skyrocketing Emerging Markets bond spreads. The 
new definition necessarily restricts the sample to those Emerging Market Economies that are 
integrated into world capital markets (i.e., that are included in the EMBI index).Table 5 
summarizes the IV probit results for these alternative definitions. As shown in the table, trade 
openness always enters the regressions with a negative and statistically significant point 
estimate. This suggests that the result that openness reduces the vulnerability to sudden stops is 
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Table 5. Instrumental Variables Probit Regressions 
(Alternative Sudden Stop Definitions) 
  SS1 SS2 SS3 SS4 SS5  Systemic 
Trade Openness t-1 
-1.95 
(0.55)*** 




-0.89   
(0.48)* 









  (0.22) 






0.47     
(0.46)   
Liability Dollarization  t-1  
0.56 
(0.22)** 



















  (1.21)*** 
-5.67    
(1.54)*** 
-5.91   
(2.34)** 
Regional Dummies?  YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES 










-1.19    
(0.45)*** 
Obs.  1040 1040 1040 1040 1024  355 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% / ** Statistically Significant at 5% / * Statistically Significant at 10% 
We use five  alternative definitions of sudden stops: our preferred definition “SS1”, and four alternative “SS2”, 
“SS3” ,“SS4” and “SS5”. “SS2” and “SS3” are conceptually equivalent to “SS1”, but are more restrictive in that 
they capture fewer episodes. “SS4” is, instead, equivalent to “SS1” but is less restrictive in that classifies as sudden 
stops events that don’t necessarily trigger output contractions. “SS5” is equivalent to “SS1” but uses the criterion 
that the sudden stop be accompanied by a loss of reserves rather than a fall in output. 
“Systemic” is borrowed from Calvo et. al. (2006) and combines a fall in net capital inflows with an increase in 
emerging markets bond spreads. 
 
We also check that our results are not determined by outliers. In particular, we check that 
they are not driven by the inclusion of African countries, or other poor nations that have limited 
access to private capital markets. In Table 6 we show that our results for both ordinary probit and 
IV regressions are robust to the exclusion of African countries and also to the poorest 25% 
percentile countries.    26
Table 6. Excluding Poor Countries 
  Ordinary 
Probit  IV Probit  Ordinary 
Probit  IV Probit  Ordinary 
Probit  IV Probit  Ordinary 





































































































Rigidity Index t-1 


























Ln Reserves in 
Months of Imports t-1 








Regional Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
















Obs.  870 801 825 816 430 413 403 413 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% / ** Statistically Significant at 5% / * Statistically Significant at 10% 
The next step is to look at an alternative dependent variable, one that combines crisis 
episodes with the depth of the crisis, where the latter is measured in terms of the recessionary 
impact of an event. We choose to use the output lost during the crisis year (Loss1), plus the year 
immediately after the crisis (Loss2), and up to three years after the crisis (Loss3).
38 Because 
output losses are conditional on sudden stops, a natural approach is a Heckman selection model 
that takes the probit regression of sudden stops as a first stage, and estimate a linear model in the 
second stage only for the cases when sudden stops actually occurred.
39 The results are reported in 









                                                 
38 Summary statistics are in Appendix A.4. 
39 See Maddala (1983) for more detailed specification requirements.   27
Table 7. Heckman Selection Model 






-10.778 -6.999  -4.904 
Trade openness t-1 
(4.53)**  (3.27) **  (2.40) ** 
-0.315 -1.865  -1.829  Foreign Debt/ GDP t-1 
(3.94) (1.46)  (1.85) 
-1.892 0.229  0.294  Liability Dollarization  t-1 
(1.84) (-0.26)  (-0.33) 
-4.288 -1.954  -1.835 
Ln Reserves in Months of Imports 
(3.00) (0.73)***  (0.71)  *** 
-0.224 0.062  0.097  Short Term Debt/ Total Debt  t-1 
(0.18) (-0.09)  (-0.08) 
28.57 8.546  5.57 
Constant 
(-32.47) (-9.09)  (-7.43) 
  
Selection Equation 
Sudden Stop Sudden Stop  Sudden Stop 
-0.214 -0.229  -0.298 
Trade openness t-1 
(0.21) (0.22)  (0.23) 
-2.083 -1.068  -0.323  Current Account/ GDP t-1 
(0.50) ***  (0.49) **  (0.53) 
-2.929 -2.767  -2.63 
Constant 
(0.41)*** (0.37)***  (0.35)*** 
Year Fixed-Effects  YES YES  YES 
Regional Dummies 
YES YES  YES 
Observations 
2948 2903  2861 
Uncensored observations  32 57  76 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
We find that openness dampens the contractionary effects of crises, in a very significant 
way: taking the output loss during the year of the crisis as a reference point (column 1), the 
results suggest that a 10 percent point increase in trade openness reduces the output loss of crises 
that occur by a full percentage point of GDP.
40 The “Lag of reserves in months of imports” is 
                                                 
40 To arrive to this result, we multiply the variation in the independent variable (0.10) by the coefficient of trade 
openness in the outcome equation (-10.778). The result is the cumulative output loss expressed as a share of GDP.    28
typically negative and statistically significant, meaning that the presence of a large stockpile of 
reserves tends to dampen the recession that might come in the aftermath of an external crisis. 
The other variables are not significant. These control variables were selected after some 
experimentation to achieve the best possible fit for the regression, but without regard to the 
coefficient on openness per se.
41  
In short, the evidence suggests that openness tends to reduce the contractions that might 
follow crisis episodes. Some additional robustness checks are reported in Appendix A.5. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In summary, the evidence overall appears to be quite robust. Economies that trade less with other 
countries are more prone to sudden stops and to currency crashes. Controlling for other plausible 
determinants of these shocks and instrumenting trade openness by gravity estimates to avoid 
identification problems, we find a causal link between lack of openness to trade and the 
instability of financial flows. In fact, out of the set of controls we tried, only trade openness and 
the size of current account deficit before the shock appear as significant predictors of sudden 
stops. Trade openness, foreign debt, reserves and the nominal exchange rate rigidity also appear 
as significant predictors of the other form of external crises analyzed.  
The effect of trade openness on the probability of sudden stop appears to be not only 
qualitatively robust, but also quantitatively significant. A conservative estimate yields the 
surprising result that, all else equal, increasing the trade to GDP ratio by 10 percentage points 
(i.e., going from Argentina’s current trade share to Australia’s average trade share) reduces the 
probability of a sudden stop by approximately 1 percentage point.  Given that sudden stops are 
low-probability events, this is equivalent to approximately 40 percent of the unconditional 
probability of a crisis.  We also find some evidence that more openness reduces the output cost 
associated with crises.  
 
                                                 
41 With the Heckman selection model, better identification is achieved if some of the variables included in the first 
stage (selection model) are not included in the second stage (outcome equation). Thus, in the selection model we 
have only included lagged trade openness, the lagged current account balance as a share of GDP, year fixed-effects 
and regional dummies.    29
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Appendices 
 
A.1 Sudden Stops 
 
We use five alternative definitions of sudden stops: our preferred definition “SS1”, and four 
alternative “SS2”, “SS3” and “SS4”. “SS2” and “SS3” are conceptually equivalent to “SS1”, but 
are more restrictive in that they capture fewer episodes. “SS4” is, instead, equivalent to “SS1” 
but is less restrictive in that it classifies as sudden stops events that do not necessarily trigger 
recessions. “SS5” is equivalent to “SS1” but uses the criterion that the sudden stop be 
accompanied by a loss of reserves rather than a fall in output. 
 
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 1” (SS1): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries in the period 
1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70s, 80s, 90s+) separately and 
then compute the mean standard deviation by averaging the results obtained for each decade. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in the sample. 
Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial account between 
years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only observations that show reductions 
in FA surpluses). Observations that don’t pass this filter, because they show either a year-to-year 
increase in the FA; or a year-to-year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those that represent a 
reduction in the FA surplus that is above two standard deviations from the mean standard 
deviation computed in step (2). Observations that do not pass this filter are classified as “0” 
adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP per capita in 
that country during the same year or the year immediately after. Observations that do not pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account deficit in that 
country during the same year or the year immediately after. Observations that do not pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent episodes 
(country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as either “0” which 
means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, or “n.a” which means that 
some data is missing.  
9) Results:   
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
86 3510  1651   35
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 2” (SS2): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries in the period 
1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70s, 80s, 90s+) separately. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in the sample. 
Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial account between 
years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e., keep only observations that show reductions 
in FA surpluses). Observations that do not pass this filter, because they show either a year-to-year 
increase in the FA; or a year-to-year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those that represent a 
reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from the corresponding decade 
standard deviation computed in step (2). Observations that do not pass this filter are classified as 
“0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP per capita in 
that country during the same year or the year immediately after. Observations that do not pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account deficit in that 
country during the same year or the year immediately after. Observations that do not pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent episodes 
(country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as either “0” which 
means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, or “n.a” which means that 
some data is missing.  
9) Results:   
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
68 3531  1648   36
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 3” (SS3): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries in the period 
1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in the sample. 
Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
3)  Compute the standard deviation the year to year changes for each decade (70s, 80s, 90s+) 
separately and then compute the mean standard deviation by averaging the results obtained for 
each decade 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial account between 
years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e., keep only observations that show reductions 
in FA surpluses). Observations that do not pass this filter, because they show either a year-to-year 
increase in the FA; or a year-to-year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those that represent a 
reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from the mean standard deviation 
computed in step (3). Observations that do not pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the 
“0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in GDP per capita in 
that country during the same year or the year immediately after. Observations that do not pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account deficit in that 
country during the same year or the year immediately after. Observations that do not pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent episodes 
(country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as either “0” which 
means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, or “n.a” which means that 
some data is missing.  
9) Results:   
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
 
 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
48 3551  1648   37
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 4” (SS4): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries in the period 
1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70s, 80s, 9’s+) separately and 
then compute the mean standard deviation by averaging the results obtained for each decade. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in the sample. 
Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial account between 
years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e. keep only observations that show reductions 
in FA surpluses). Observations that do not pass this filter, because they show either a year-to-year 
increase in the FA; or a year-to-year reduction in an outstanding FA deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those that represent a 
reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from the mean standard deviation 
computed in step (2). Observations that do not pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the 
“0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account deficit in that 
country during the same year or the year immediately after. Observations that do not pass this 
filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from steps (4), (5) and (6). 
7)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent episodes 
(country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as either “0” which 
means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, or “n.a” which means that 
some data is missing.  
8) Results:   





“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
145 3450  1652   38
Algorithm used to compute “Sudden Stop 5” (SS5): 
 
1)  Use IFS Financial Account Data (Line 78B) annual data for all available countries in the 
period 1970-2002.  
2)  Compute the standard deviation of observations for each decade (70s, 80s, 90s+) separately 
and then compute the mean standard deviation by averaging the results obtained for each 
decade. 
3)  Compute the year to year changes in the financial account (FA) for all countries in the 
sample. Unavailable data points are classified as “n.a.” 
4)  Filter to keep observations (country/year) that show reductions in the financial account 
between years “t” and “t-1” if at “t-1” FA was in surplus (i.e., keep only observations that 
show reductions in FA surpluses). Observations that do not pass this filter, because they show 
either a year-to-year increase in the FA; or a year-to-year reduction in an outstanding FA 
deficit are classified as “0”.  
5)  Filter again to keep (out of the observations already filtered in step (4)) only those that 
represent a reduction in the FA surplus that is above 2 standard deviations from the mean 
standard deviation computed in step (2). Observations that do not pass this filter are classified 
as “0” adding to the “0’s” from step (4). 
6)  Filter again to keep only those observations that are accompanied by a fall in International 
Reserves (Line 1L.DZF) of 10% or more with respect the level in the previous year in that 
country during the same year. Observations that do not pass this filter are classified as “0” 
adding to the “0’s” from steps (4) and (5) 
7)  Filter again to keep only those that are accompanied by a fall in the current account deficit in 
that country during the same year or the year immediately after. Observations that do not  
pass this filter are classified as “0” adding to the “0’s” from steps (4), (5) and (6). 
8)  Classify the observations that survive all filters as “1” indicating that they represent episodes 
(country/year) when SS took place. The other observations are classified as either “0” which 
means no episodes were registered during that year in that country, or “n.a” which means that 
some data is missing.  
9) Results:   
 
Number of Observations in the Dataset 
“1” sudden stop  “0” no episode  “n.a.” no data 
55 3343  2407   39  
Table A.1. Sudden Stop 1 
 
Country Data  Availability Episodes          
Afghanistan, I.S. of  1980 - 1989  0          
Algeria   1978 - 1991  1  1990       
Angola   1986 - 2001  0          
Antigua and Barbuda   1978 - 2001  0          
Argentina   1977 - 2002  1  2001       
Aruba   1987 - 2001  0          
Australia   1971 - 2002  0          
Austria   1971 - 2002  0          
Bahamas, The 
1977 – 1982 
 1985 - 2001  0          
Bahrain, Kingdom of  1976 - 2002  0          
Bangladesh   1977 - 2002  0          
Barbados   1971 - 2001  1  1982       
Belize   1985 - 2002  0          
Benin   1975 - 2001  1  1983       
Bolivia   1977 - 2002  1  1982       
Bosnia & Herzegovina  1999 - 2002  0          
Botswana   1976 - 1999  0          
Brazil   1976 - 2002  0          
Bulgaria   1981 - 2002  0          
Burkina Faso   1975 - 1996  1  1989       
Burundi   1986 - 2002  0          
Cambodia   1993 - 2002  0          
Cameroon   1978 - 1995  2  1988  1990    
Canada   1971 - 2002  1  1982       
Cape Verde   1978 - 2002  1  1990       
Central African Rep.  1978 - 1994  1  1988       
Chad   1978 - 1994  0          
Chile   1976 - 2002  3  1982  1983  1998 
China,P.R.: Mainland  1983 - 2002  0          
China,P.R.:Hong Kong  1999 - 2002  0          
Colombia   1971 - 2002  2  1998  1999    
Comoros   1981 - 1995  1  1988       
Congo, Republic of  1979 - 2002  2  1984  1996    
Costa Rica   1978 - 2002  2  1981  1996    
Côte d'Ivoire   1976 - 2002  0          
Croatia   1994 - 2002  0          
Cyprus   1977 - 2002  0          
Czech Republic   1994 - 2002  0          
Denmark  
1976 - 1978  
1982 - 2002  0          
Djibouti   1993 - 1995  0            40  
Country Data  Availability Episodes          
Dominica   1977 - 2001  1  2001       
Dominican Republic   1971 - 2002  0          
Ecuador   1977 - 2002  2  1983  1999    
Egypt   1978 - 2002  1  1990       
El Salvador   1977 - 2002  1  1979       
Equatorial Guinea   1988 - 1996  0          
Ethiopia   1978 - 2002  2  1982  1991    
Fiji   1980 - 1999  1  1999       
Finland   1976 - 2002  1  1991       
France   1976 - 2002  0          
Gabon   1979 - 1999  0          
Gambia, The  1979 - 1997  1  1982       
Germany   1972 - 2002  1  2001       
Ghana   1976 - 2002  0          
Greece  
1977 - 1997  
2000 - 2002  0          
Grenada   1978 - 2000  0          
Guatemala   1978 - 2002  0          
Guinea   1987 - 2002  0          
Guinea-Bissau   1983 - 1997  1  1986       
Guyana  
1978 - 1985 
 1993 - 1997  0          
Haiti   1972 - 1998  0          
Honduras   1975 - 2002  0          
Hungary   1983 - 2002  0          
Iceland   1977 - 2002  1  2001       
India   1976 - 2002  0          
Indonesia   1982 - 2002  1  1997       
Iran, I.R. of  1977 - 2000  0          
Iraq   1977 - 1977  0          
Ireland   1975 - 2002  0          
Israel   1971 - 2002  2  1988  1998    
Italy   1971 - 2002  0          
Jamaica   1977 - 2002  0          
Japan   1978 - 2002  0          
Jordan   1973 - 2002  2  1992  1993    
Kenya   1976 - 2001  0          
Kiribati   1980 - 1994  0          
Korea   1977 - 2002  1  1997       
Kuwait   1976 - 2002  0          
Kyrgyz Republic   1994 - 2002  0          
Lao People's Dem.Rep  1985 - 2001  0          
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Country Data  Availability Episodes          
Lesotho   1976 - 2002  0          
Liberia   1980 - 1987  0          
Libya   1978 - 1999  0          
Macedonia, FYR  1976 - 2001  0          
Madagascar   1997 - 2002  0          
Malawi   1975 - 2002  1  1981       
Malaysia   1978 - 2002  1  1997       
Maldives   1975 - 2002  0          
Mali   1978 - 2002  0          
Malta   1976 - 2001  1  2000       
Mauritania   1972 - 2002  0          
Mauritius   1976 - 1998  0          
Mexico   1977 - 2002  3  1982  1994  1995 
Mongolia   1980 - 2002  2  1990  1991    
Montserrat   1982 - 2002  0          
Morocco   1976 - 2002  1  1995       
Mozambique   1981 - 2001  0          
Myanmar   1977 - 2001  0          
Namibia   1991 - 2002  0          
Nepal   1977 - 2000  0          
Netherlands   1971 - 2002  1  1981       
Netherlands Antilles   1977 - 2002  0          
New Zealand   1973 - 2002  2  1988  1998    
Nicaragua   1978 - 2002  1  1986       
Niger   1975 - 1995  0          
Nigeria   1978 - 1999  1  1999       
Norway   1976 - 2002  0          
Oman   1975 - 2001  2  1987  1999    
Pakistan   1977 - 2002  0          
Panama   1978 - 2002  1  2000       
Papua New Guinea   1977 - 2001  0          
Paraguay   1976 - 2002  1  2002       
Peru   1978 - 2002  1  1998       
Philippines   1978 - 2002  2  1997  1998    
Poland   1977 - 2002  0          
Portugal   1976 - 2002  1  1992       
Romania   1972 - 2002  0          
Rwanda   1977 - 2002  1  1994       
Samoa   1978 - 1999  0          
São Tomé & Príncipe 
1975 - 1990  
2000 - 2002  0          
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Country Data  Availability Episodes             
Saudi Arabia  1972 - 2002  0             
Senegal  1975 - 1999  0             
Seychelles  1977 - 2002  1  2000          
Sierra Leone  1978 - 1995  0             
Singapore  1973 - 2002  0             
Slovak Republic  1994 - 2000  0             
Slovenia  1993 - 2002  0             
Solomon Islands  1976 - 1998  1  1998          
Somalia  1978 - 1989  0             
South Africa  1986 - 2002  0             
Spain  1976 - 2002  1  1992          
Sri Lanka  1976 - 2002  1  2001          
St. Kitts and Nevis  1981 - 2001  0             
St. Lucia  1977 - 2001  1  2001          
St. Vincent & Grens.  1979 - 2001  1  2000          
Sudan  1978 - 2002  0             
Suriname  1978 - 2002  1  1992          
Swaziland  1975 - 2002  1  1999          
Sweden  1971 - 2002  1  1991          
Switzerland  1978 - 2002  0             
Syrian Arab Republic  1978 - 2000  1  1989          
Tanzania  1977 - 2002  0             
Thailand  1976 - 2002  1  1997          
Togo  1975 - 2001  0             
Tonga  1972 - 1993  1  1989          
Trinidad and Tobago  1976 - 2001  1  1984          
Tunisia  1977 - 2002  0             
Turkey  1975  -  2002  4  1991 1994 1998 2001 
Uganda   1981 - 2002  0             
United Kingdom   1971 - 2002  0             
United States   1971 - 2002  0             
Uruguay   1979 - 2002  1  2002          
Vanuatu   1983 - 2001  1  1991          
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  1971 - 2002  1  1994          
Vietnam   1997 - 2002  0             
Yemen, Republic of  1991 - 2002  1  1994          
Zambia  
1979 – 1991 
1998 - 2000  1  1990          
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A.2. Gravity Estimates 
 
To compute the gravity estimates we use the Frankel and Rose (2002) dataset. It consists of 
41,678 bilateral trade observations spanning six different years (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 
and 1995). All 186 countries, dependencies, territories, overseas departments, colonies, and so 
forth for which the United Nations Statistical Office collects international trade data are included 
in the data set. The trade data are taken from the World Trade Database, a consistent 
recompilation of the U.N. trade data presented in Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997), 
augmented with data from the U.N.’s International Trade Statistics Yearbook. This data set is 
estimated to cover at least 98 percent  of all trade. 
 
For each of the six different years for which we have data we compute OLS regressions of the 
following form: 
 
Log (Ti,j / Yi) = c + α logdisti,j + βlogpop2 + γcomlangi,j + δborderi,j + θareapi,j + ρlandlock + μ 
 
Where “Ti,j” is the bilateral trade value between countries “i” and “j”; “Yi” is the real GDP of 
country “i”; “c” is a constant term; “logdisti,j” is the log of the distance between the economic 
centers of countries “i” and “j”; “comlang” is a dummy variable that takes value one if “i” and 
“j” share a common language and is zero otherwise; “border”  is a dummy variable that takes 
value one if “i” and “j” share a border and is zero otherwise; “areapi,j” is the log of the product of 
the areas (in km
2) of countries “i” and “j”; and “landlock” takes values two if “i” and “j” are both 
landlocked,  one if either “i” or “j” are landlocked, and zero otherwise; and “μ” is the error term.  
 
As an example, we report the results obtained for the equation estimated for 1990: 
 
Instrumental Variable (First Stage) Generation 
 
Log (Ti,j / Yi)  = -0.94 logdisti,j + 0.82logpop2 + 0.53 comlangi,j 
                            (0.05)               (0.02)                 (0.11) 
+ 0.64 borderi,j - 0.27areapi,j - 0.47 landlock 
(0.21)               (0.01)               (0.08) 
 
Equation estimated for 1990 using OLS. R
2 = 0.28; Number of Observations = 4052. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; intercept not reported. 
 
The correlation between trade ratio and generated IV for the entire panel is 0.52. 
 
The gravity estimates (or predicted trade to GDP ratios used in the regressions) are generated by 
taking the exponent of fitted values and summing across bilateral partners j. This yields estimates 
for six different years: 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. The missing values of the panel 
are generated by taking the observation corresponding to the closest year with data.    44  
A.3. A Short Taxonomy of Crisis Definitions 
 
There are a variety of definitions of external crises available in the literature. A popular one is 
the concept of “current account reversal” (for example, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin 1998, 2000 and 
Edwards 2004a, 2004b), which is typically defined as a reduction in the current account deficit 
of a certain percentage of GDP in one year. A somewhat related concept is the definition of 
“Sudden Stops” in capital flows, popularized by Guillermo Calvo and his associates, which is 
typically defined as an unexpected reduction in net capital inflows. The way the concept is made 
operational varies from author to author and from sample to sample. Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía 
(2003) originally defined it as episodes when capital flows fall at least two standard deviations 
below the sample mean (this addresses the “unexpected” requirement of sudden stops). 
Additionally, to guarantee that the fall in capital inflows is not the result of a positive shock such 
as an improvement in the terms-of-trade,  they add the criterion of costly reduction in economic 
activity.   Another way of making sure that sudden stop include only cutoffs of capital inflow and 
not reversals in the current account arising from positive trade developments might be to add the 
criterion that the initial impact is a loss of reserves. 
 
In order to isolate episodes of capital account reversals related to systemic events of an external 
origin, Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (2006) refined the definition of sudden stops as periods 
of capital inflows collapse with skyrocketing Emerging Markets bond spreads. The new 
definition necessarily restricts the sample to those Emerging Market Economies that are 
integrated to world capital markets (i.e., that are included in the EMBI index). Some authors who 
have sought to identify capital account reversals for a wider sample of countries (including 
Edwards 2004b and ourselves in this paper) have continued to follow the original sudden stops 
definition with minimal variations.  
 
Guidotti, Sturzenegger and Villar (2004), also building on a slightly modified version of the 
original sudden stop definition, distinguish between sudden stops that lead to current account 
reversals and those that do not. When sudden stops are not accompanied by current account 
reversals, then presumably the country found an alternative source of financing, namely reserve 
depletion or exceptional funding from an international financial institution. Reserve depletion is 
feasible only when the Central Bank has sufficient international reserves to spend and is willing 
to use them. If the sudden stop is persistent (i.e., if capital inflows are not restored promptly), 
then the strategy of reserve depletion could lead to a “currency crisis.”   
 
There is no single unambiguous definition of currency crises. One widely-used measure comes 
from the work of Frankel and Rose (1996), updated in Frankel and Wei (2004). The latter define 
crisis episodes based on the foreign market pressure index. This index is defined as the 
percentage fall in reserves plus the percentage fall in the foreign exchange value of the currency. 
The idea of the index is that it measures the fall in demand for the country’s currency; it is then 
up to the monetary authorities to determine whether to accommodate, by letting the money 
supply fall, or to depreciate. A related definition, also from Frankel and Rose (1996) updated in 
Frankel (2005), is that of “currency crashes.” A currency crash is simply a large fall in the value 
of the currency (the devaluation must be at least 25 percent on a cumulative 12-month basis), and 
one that also represents an acceleration over preceding years (the devaluation must represent an   45  
acceleration of at least 10 percentage points, relative to the rate of depreciation in the 12 months 
before that). Finally, a currency crash must have been at least three years since the last crisis. 
Eichengreen et. al. (1995) have a similar approach, but they expand the definition to include 
“speculative attacks” that are successfully warded off by the authorities, not just speculative 
attacks that end up in currency crises. They make the idea of an unsuccessful speculative attack 
operational by searching for sudden falls in reserves and/or increases in interest rate. This 
alternative definition has as a drawback that because few countries have market-determined 
short-interest rates with long histories, it has limited applicability in broader samples such as we 
wish to use in this paper.  
 
Most of these concepts are closely related, but they do not always occur together.  More likely 
than not, a sudden stop, particularly a large and persistent one, will eventually lead to a current 
account reversal. Whether it also entails a currency crisis or not depends on whether reserves 
become depleted, and on the exchange rate regime in place before the shock.  
 
Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998, 2000) study the relation between currency crises and current 
account reversals. They conclude that they are only tenuously related. Similarly, in this paper we 
find only weak correlation between sudden stops and currency crises. The weak correlation has 
two possible explanations: perhaps only a subset of sudden stops and current account reversals 
ultimately lead to currency crisis, and/or currency crises constitute a broader concept of crises 
with additional (or perhaps different) triggers. Both explanations appear to be supported by the 
data. Milesi-Ferreti and Razin report that less than one-third of all current account reversals in 
their sample were associated to currency crises. In our sample, we find that currency crises are 
more than three times more frequent than sudden stops. Sebastian Edwards finds that current 
account reversals are approximately twice as common as sudden stops in his sample.  
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A.4. Summary Statistics and Data Sources 
    
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
SS1 3596  .0239155  .1528071  0  1 
SS1bis (no contiguous crises)  3590  .0222841  .1476266  0  1 
SS2 3599  .0188941  .1361701  0  1 
SS2bis (no contiguous crises)  3596  .0180756  .1332436  0  1 
SS3 3599  .013337  .1147293  0  1 
SS3bis (no contiguous crises)   3597  .0127884  .1123762  0  1 
SS4 3595  .0403338  .1967683  0  1 
SS4bis (no contiguous crises)  3587  .0381935  .1916898  0  1 
Trade Openness  (A)  4247  .7322445  .432648  2.960163  .0153068 
Fitted Openess  (B)  4261  .1487951  .1497813  1.364657  .0016543 
Liability 
Dollarization  (1)  (C)  3454 .3207969 .3902904  0  1.999936 
Liability  
Dollarization (2)  (D)  897 .2666019 .2752479  0  1 
CA / GDP (F)  3630  -.038277  .1034782  -2.404958  .58553 
Foreign Debt / GDP (G)  1791        .2779454      .4373619         0  5.844839 
Index of Exchange Rate Rigidity  
(H)  3059 2.411246 .8072297  1  3 
Voice and  
Accountability  (I)  3255  .3525906  .9023457 -1.623367 1.693636 
Political Stability/Lack of 
Violence (I)  3038 .2303492 .8255066  -1.694225  1.69047 
Effectiveness of Government        
(I)  3038  .3136892  .8409723 -1.320767 2.082198 
Regulatory  Framework  (I)  3224  .3598345  .5851707 -1.500832 1.244778 
Rule of Law (I)  3224  .2939932  .871838  -1.203638  1.995832 
Control of Corruption (I)  3038  .2972141  .9230486  -1.104606  2.129017 
FDI / GDP (J)  3963       1.902769      4.577513  -82.81054     145.2095 
Reserves in Month of Imports       
(K)  3795  3.420814  2.958747  -.0919    32.14791 
GDP per capita  (L)  2799  6840.761  9583.074  84.72  52675.27 
Short Term Debt / Total 
External Debt  (M)  3430        12.39872     12.85917      0  99.90642 
Polity 2  (O)  4102        .4193077      7.567316         -10     10 
 Crisis Episodes                (P)  3039        .1378743      .3448247         0  1 
Loss1  (Q)  3414  .0223084  1.162598 -18.82909 50.24807 
Loss2 (Q)    3419     .0076576      1.527236    - 35.22408     50.24807 
Loss3 (Q)    3425   -.0485739      1.733652    -35.22408     50.24807 
(A) The negative of the trade to GDP ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD ROM. 
(B) See Appendix A.2 for an explanation of the methodology employed and data used. 
(C) The ratio of foreign liabilities of the financial sector to money. Source: IFS (Line 26C/line 34). 
(D) The ratio of “Total Dollar Deposits/Total Deposits. Source: Arteta (2005a) and Arteta (2005b).  
(F) Ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD ROM. 
(G) Source: IFS line 89c. 
(H) index=1 is (de-facto) flexible exchange rate; index=2 is (de-facto) intermediate arrangement; and index=3 is 
(de-facto) peg. Source: Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
(I) Source: Kaufman et al. (2002). 
(J) Source: WDI-CR ROM. 
(K) Source: WDI-CD ROM. 
(L) Source: WDI-CD ROM.   47  
(M) Ratio over 100. Source: WDI-CD Rom 
(O) Range = -10 to 10 (-10 = high autocracy; 10 = high democracy). Combined Polity Score: Computed by 
subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC; normal range polity scores are imputed for coded “interregnum" and "transition 
period" special polity conditions, polities coded “interruption" on the POLITY variable are left blank. Source: 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
 (P) Source: Frankel and Wei (2004). The approach in Frankel and Wei (2004) is to use the foreign exchange market 
pressure index. This index is defined as the percentage fall in reserves plus the percentage fall in the foreign 
exchange value of the currency. The idea is that this index measures the fall in demand for the country’s currency; it 
is then up to the monetary authorities to determine whether to accommodate, by letting the money supply fall, or to 
depreciate. To avoid treating every year of a multi-year high-inflation period as a separate crisis, the approach 
followed by the authors requires that for an event to be considered a crisis episode, the increase in exchange market 
pressure must represent an acceleration of at least an additional 10 percent over the preceding period; and they also 
adopt an exclusion window of three years.  
(Q) Source: WDI-CD ROM.   48  
A.5. Additional Graphs and Tables 
 
The following figures depict the temporal distribution of the additional sudden stops definitions 
that have been tried for robustness checks purposes. As shown, the distribution is very similar to 
that of “SS1” in Figure 1.  
Figure A.5.1. Sudden Stop 2 
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  Figure A.5.2. Sudden Stop 3 
                  Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure A.5.3. Sudden Stop 4 
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            Source: Author’s calculations.  
 
Figure A.5.5. “Systemic Sudden Stop” (Calvo et al., 2006) 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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  The following tables complement Tables 1 and 2 in the main text. The main differences 
are that trade openness is not lagged (to verify that the results are robust when contemporaneous 
rather than lagged variables are used) and that some additional control variables are also 
included. 
 
Table A.5.1. Ordinary Probit Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Trade openness t 
-0.53   
(0.259)** 
-0.691   
(0.329)** 
-0.898    
(0.348)** 
-0.705   
(0.278)** 
-0.831   
(0.344)** 
-0.86   
(0.343)** 
-0.479   
(0.247)* 
-3.01   
(0.998)** 




-4.068   
(1.297)** 
-4.98   
(1.781)** 
-5.60   
(1.888)** 
-4.99   
(1.632)** 
-5.50   
(1.862)** 
-5.417   
(1.902)** 
-3.42   
(1.308)** 
-9.69   
(2.86)*** 




-0.080    
(0.217) 
-0.144   
(0.243) 
-0.028   
(0.238) 
-0.063   
(0.236) 
-0.087   
(0.235) 
-0.07    
(0.243)    -0.860   
(0.685) 
-0.995   
(0.453)** 
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1     1.168   
(0.765) 
0.553    
(0.686) 
0.9776   
(0.772) 
0.951   
(0.855) 
0.358    
(0.601) 









0.399   
(0.216)**    0.244   
(0.242) 
0.324   
(0.268) 
0.236   
(0.266) 
0.302   
0.2455    0.599    
(0.229)** 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t    -0.059   
(0.245) 
0.170   
(0.269)    0.137   
(0.201) 
0.141   
(0.268) 
0.065   
(0.187)    0.4143   
(0.359) 
Ln GDP  




0.106   
(0.134)    0.035   
(0.190) 
0.175  
(0.152)    -0.075   
(0.223) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
          0.733   
(1.416)   
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
         0.224   
(0.146) 
FDI/GDP t-1            -0.0974   
(0.074) 
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
          -0.121   
(0.1165) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  -2.544   
(0.63)*** 
-1.255   
(1.064) 
-2.165     
(1.372) 








-0.244   
(1.099) 
-1.99   
(1.73) 
Obs.  778 597 447 564 508 464 904 113 296 
R
2  0.0992 0.1178 0.1115 0.1037 0.1156 0.1154 0.0872 0.2927 0.2033 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10% 
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Table A.5.2. Instrumental Variables Probit Regressions 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 










































(0.26)    0.79 






Short Term Debt/ Total 
Debt  t-1     0.13 
(0.69) 
1.12 













(0.29)    0.59 
(0.23)** 
0.034 
(0.31)    0.33 
(0.30) 
Effectiveness of 









(0.25)    0.22 
(0.29) 
Ln GDP  









(0.20)*    0.15 
(0.21) 
Liability  
Dollarization  t-1 (2)             -0.78 
(0.99)   
Exchange Rate Rigidity 
Index t-1 
             0.07 
(0.165) 
FDI/GDP t-1             0.064 
(0.05) 
Ln Reserves in Months 
of Imports t-1              0.062 
(0.14) 
Regional Dummies?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
















Obs. 1040  915  1177  748  1458  706  260  560 
     Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
     *** Statistically Significant at 1% / ** Statistically Significant at 5% / * Statistically Significant at 10%   53  
   Next, we show that excluding contiguous crises episodes from our sudden stops variables 
does not change the result. Table A.5.3 reports the results using SS1bis and SS3bis as alternative 
dependent variables. These are the same as SS1 and SS3 but exclude contiguous crises episodes.  
 
Table A.5.3. Sudden Stops Excluding Contiguous Crises Episodes 
 
  Ordinary Probit  IV Probit  Ordinary Probit  IV Probit 
  Sudden Stop (SS1 bis)  Sudden Stop (SS1 bis)  Sudden Stop (SS3 bis)  Sudden Stop (SS3 bis) 




































Regional Dummies?  YES YES YES  YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES YES YES  YES 








Observations  1069 1035 735 869 
    Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
    *** Statistically Significant at 1% / ** Statistically Significant at 5% / * Statistically Significant at 10%   54  
 
The following tables complement Tables 3 and 4 in the main text. The main differences 
are that trade openness is not lagged (to verify that the results are robust when contemporaneous 
rather than lagged variables are used), that some additional control variables are also included, 
and that the sample size is not limited by the availability of data on sudden stops. 
 
 
Table A.5.4. Ordinary Probit Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable: Crisis Episodes 
 [Frankel and Wei (2004) definition of exchange market pressure] 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Trade openness t 
-0.32   
(0.129)** 
-0.57   
(0.269)** 
-0.59   
(0.307)** 
-0.64    
(0.249)** 
-0.64   
(0.262)** 
-0.58   
(0.281)** 
-0.58   
(0.303)** 
Ln Reserves in 
Months of Imports t-1 
-0.21  
(0.036)*** 
-0.26   
(0.082)*** 
-0.19   
(0.087)** 
-0.30    
(0.079)** 
















0.27   
(0.218) 
0.24   
(0.233) 
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
  0.13   
(0.094) 
0.18   
(0.098)**    0.15   
(0.090)* 
0.14   
(0.097) 
0.15   
(0.103) 
Liability  
Dollarization  t-1 (1) 
-0.0003   
(0.148) 
0.027   
(0.249) 
0.024    
(0.288) 
0.062    
(0.224)     
Current Account/ 
GDP t-1 
  -0.272   
(1.392) 
-0.95   
(1.54) 
0.004    
(1.406)     0.55   
(1.381) 
FDI/GDP t-1      0.03   
(0.058)       0.03   
(0.032) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t 
      0.09    
(0.152) 
0.17    
(0.153) 
0.25   
(0.158) 
0.25   
(0.172) 
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1      0.39    
(0.694) 
0.30   
(0.711)    0.83   
(0.877) 
Ln GDP 




Regional Dummies?  YES YES YES  YES  YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES YES YES  YES  YES YES YES 
Constant  -0.599   
(0.498) 
-0.99   
(0.749) 
-0.581   
(1.085) 
-0.009   
(0.562) 
-0.486   
(0.568) 
-0.531   
(1.069)** 
-0.461   
(0.958) 
Obs.  1841  557 481  690  622 586 561 
R
2  0.0857 0.1186 0.1201  0.1252  0.1253 0.1211 0.1238 
    Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
    *** Statistically Significant at 1% 
    ** Statistically Significant at 5% 
    * Statistically Significant at 10% 
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Table A.5.5. Instrumental Variables Probit Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable: Crisis Episodes 
 [Frankel and Wei (2004) definition of exchange market pressure] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Trade openness t 
-1.41   
(0.58)** 
-1.42   
(0.59)** 








-1.41   
(0.60)** 




-0.34   
(0.08)*** 
-0.32   
(0.07)*** 
-0.24   
(0.06)*** 










0.47   
(0.25)* 
0.31   
(0.19) 
0.37   
(0.22)* 
0.44   
(0.22)*    0.44   
(0.25)* 
Exchange Rate Rigidity 
Index t-1 
0.16   
(0.08)** 
0.15   
(0.08)*    0.11   
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.08)    0.11    
(0.09) 
Liability Dollarization  t-1 
(1) 




0.18   




0.75   
(1.28) 
0.89    
(1.32) 
1.09 
(1.39)     -0.97 
(0.59) 
0.65    
(1.57) 
FDI/GDP t-1    0.01 
(0.04)       0.009   
(0.03) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t      -0.21   
(0.09)** 
-0.17   
(0.11)* 






Short Term Debt/ Total 
Debt  t-1     0.04   
(0.53) 
0.14   
(0.51)     -0.16 
(0.85) 
Ln GDP 






Regional Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
Constant  -0.8 
(0.73) 
-1.30   
(0.49)** 
-1.17   
(0.45)** 






-1.13   
(0.98) 
Obs.  586 582 637 603 564  1159 522 
    Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
    *** Statistically Significant at 1% 
    ** Statistically Significant at 5% 
    * Statistically Significant at 10%   56  
 
Finally, we redo all regressions using linear models rather than probit. All of the 
aforementioned results are robust to this alteration. We report these regressions in Tables A.5.6. 
and A.5.7. In Table A.5.6 we report results for instrumental variables GLS random effects 
estimates. Reassuringly, results are both quantitatively and qualitative similar to those in the 
comparable Table A.5.5.  
 
 
Table A.5.5. Pooled OLS (Linear) Regressions 
 
Robust standard error to clustered heterogeneity reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10% 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Trade openness t 
-0.024   
(0.013)* 




-0.033   
(0.0179)* 
-0.035   
(0.017)** 




-0.191   
(0.063)** 




-0.22   
(0.072)** 
-0.235   
(0.088)** 
-0.274   
(0.103)** 
-0.275   
(0.095)** 
-0.261   
(0.099)** 
-0.265   
(0.105)** 








-0.009   
(0.0175) 






-0.009   
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.0222)    0.100 
(0.130) 
-0.029   
(0.0193) 
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1 













0.1186   
(0.0974) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1  
(1) 
0.022   
(0.017) 
0.025   
(0.0189)    0.025   
(0.0291) 




0.0312   
(0.0276)    0.029    
(0.0346) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t    -0.002   
(0.0182) 
0.007 




0.003   
(0.0139) 
-0.070     
(0.0401)* 
0.0146   
(0.0247) 
Ln GDP  




0.005   
(0.0111)    0.003 
(0.0135) 
0.010   
(0.0099) 
0.082   
(0.0444)* 
-0.008   
(0.0138) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 
 (2) 
           -0.059 
(0.0944)   
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
           0.007   
(0.0113) 
FDI/GDP t-1           -0.0009   
(0.0019) 
Ln Reserves in 
Months of  
Imports t-1 
          0.0008   
(0.0033) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  -0.0013  
(0.014) 
0.061   
(0.0758) 
0.0007   
(0.1076) 
-0.0005   
(0.1033) 
0.014   
(0.033) 
-0.004   
(0.0965) 




0.084   
(0.1177) 
Obs.  1122  961 787 869 772 745  1235  219 599 
R
2  0.0416 0.0500 0.0550 0.0512 0.0550 0.0573 0.0373 0.1903 0.0745   57  
Table A.5.6. Instrumental Variables Linear Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable: Sudden Stop 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Trade openness t 
-0.066  
(0.02)*** 
-0.063   
(0.02)** 
















-0.317   
(0.10)*** 




-0.364   
(0.123)** 


















0.008   
(0.0222) 
0.004   
(0.0223) 
0.007 
(0.0239)    0.108 
(0.1408) 
-0.0002    
(0.0255) 
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1     0.088    
(0.0537)* 













Dollarization  t-1 
(1) 
0.027   
(0.0169) 
0.029   






0.028   
(0.0284)    0.028 
(0.0334) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t    -0.0061   
(0.0187) 
0.007 




0.007   
(0.0148) 




Ln GDP  





(0.0126)    0.009 
(0.0146) 







Dollarization  t-1 
(2) 
          -0.073 
(0.1082)   
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
         0.011 
( 0.0119) 
FDI/GDP t-1            -0.0003 
(0.0032) 
Ln Reserves in 
Months of 
Imports t-1 
          -0.0014 
(0.0036) 
Regional 
Dummies?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects?  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  0.0363   
(0.027) 
















Obs.  1040  914 747 800 731 705  1176  215 559 
R
2  0.0421 0.0508 0.0548 0.0491 0.0546 0.0571 0.0337 0.1923 0.0769 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
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Table A.5.7. Instrumental Variables GLS Random-Effects Regressions 
 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 





-0.100   
(0.0387)** 
-0.105    
(0.0423)** 
-0.088   
(0.040)** 










-0.317   
(0.01)*** 
-0.340   
(0.1085)** 
-0.395   
(0.129)** 
-0.382   
(0.119)*** 
-0.361   
(0.1275)** 
-0.380   
(0.1325)** 
-0.230    
(0.0888)** 
-0.665   
(0.3354)** 






-0.003   
(0.0188) 
0.012   
(0.0223) 




0.007   
(0.0235)    0.108   
(0.0945) 
0.008   
(0.0235) 
Short Term Debt/ 
Total Debt  t-1     0.088   
(0.0632) 
0.066   
(0.0633) 
0.082   
(0.0647) 
0.071   
(0.0692) 
0.025   
(0.0486) 
-0.023   
(0.1807) 
0.063   
(0.0704) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 (1) 
0.027   
(0.015)* 
0.029   
(0.0168)*    0.014   
(0.0234) 
0.024   
(0.0247) 
0.016   
(0.0251) 
0.028   
(0.0192)    0.015   
(0.0251) 
Effectiveness of 
Government  t    -0.008   
(0.015) 
0.007   
(0.0172)    0.011   
(0.0166) 
0.007   
(0.0186) 
0.007   
(0.0123) 
-0.072   
(0.0417)* 
0.006   
(0.0187) 
Ln GDP 
per capita t-1    -0.003   
(0.0094) 
0.011   
(0.0141) 
0.0167    
(0.0141)    0.009   
(0.0148) 
0.014   
(0.0102) 
0.086   
(0.0468)* 
0.009   
(0.0148) 
Liability 
Dollarization  t-1 (2)           -0.073    
(0.0875)   
Exchange Rate 
Rigidity Index t-1 
            0.011   
(0.013) 
FDI/GDP t-1           0.0007   
(0.0033) 
Ln Reserves in 
Months of Imports t-
1 
          0.003     
(0.0030) 
Regional  Dummies?  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects?  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant  0.024   
(0.0999) 
0.078   
(0.1274) 
0.050   
(0.1701) 
-0.029   
(0.1505) 
0.092   
(0.1440) 
0.064    
(0.1748) 






Obs.  1040  914 747 800 731 705  1176  215 705 
R
2  0.0435  0.0503 0.0564 0.0499 0.0557 0.0583 0.0345 0.1931 0.0576 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis.  
*** Statistically Significant at 1% 
** Statistically Significant at 5% 
* Statistically Significant at 10% Filename: 618  Edited.doc 
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